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Taxing  a variable  input  in polluting  activities  makes  sense when
abatement  is induced  indirectly,  rather than by a pollution  tax.
By including a gasoline tax in an otherwise well-composed
control program  for Mexico  City, one saves 11 percent of the
welfare costs of the program, because  - keeping emissions
constant-  costly  technical  abatement  measures  are  replaced  by
cheaper  demand  conservation.
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Without  continuous  monitoring  of emissions,  a  independent  of the price elasticity  of demand for
pollution  control agency  needs  to evaluate  the polluting  good. But the higher  the demand
abatement  options itself. Apart from making  elasticity,  the higher  are the costs of not
activities  cleaner,  it should also stimulate  including  a presumptive  tax on the polluting
reductions  in the level of activity  in polluting  good in the tool kit of the pollution  control
sectors.  agency.
Eskeland  develops  an analytical  framework  Eskeland  estimates  the cost savings  available
to show that a tax on a variable  input,  such as  when an optimal  gasoline  tax is included  in an
gasoline,  is useful for this purpose.  It encourages  otherwise  well-composed  program,  appropriately
individuals  and firms  to sacrifice  trips when  they  accounting  for the welfare  costs  of demand
would prefer  those sacrifices  to those of higher  consumption.  He shows  that the targeted
spending  on abatement.  The instrument  exploits  emission  reductions  can be obtained at 11
privately  held information  about  which  trips can  percent  lower costs, saving $64 million  annually,
be saved at a low social cost.  when the demand  conservation  induced  by the
gasoline  tax allows some  other, more  expensive
Other weaknesses  of a program  based on  abatement  options  to remain  unused.
indirect  instruments  - as opposed  to one
induced  by a theoretically  conceived  pollution  He proposes  an ad valorem gasoline  tax of
tax  - remain.  One of these is that the agency  about  25 percent, when  no separate  value is
may have poorer information  than individuals  associated  with the collection  of revenue  or with
and firms about the status of vehicles  and the  avoidance  of noise, congestion,  accidents,  and
effectiveness  of individual  abatement  options.  road damage.  In Mexico  City alone,  the tax
Such an information  gap - which could  be  would  collect $350  million  a year. After recent
bridged  by a true pollution  tax  - is abstracted  price increases,  implicit  tax rates  in Mexico  City
from the analysis.  are higher  than suggested  by Eske'and's
analysis.  Higher  rates may or may not be
Eskeland  shows that the tax rate that belongs  justified due to the benefits  of demand
in a cost-effective  pollution  control  program  is  conservation  not accounted  for in the analysis.
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1  Introdution
The topic of this paper is prompted by a prosaic, but practical challenge: how to reduce
air pollution from transport in a metropolitan area like Mexico City, while keeping an eye at the
welfare costs of doing so.  A least cost solution to such a problem could involve behavioral
change, such as modified travel patterns, as well as a number of technical modifications,  whether
in the form of tune-ups or retrofitting of existing capital equipment, or in the form of new
configurations of machinery (e.g. catalytic converters), fuels, etc.
These details have not been of great interest to economists in the public finance tradition
(with some notable exceptions), since a proposed tax levied on individual  emissions wofld provide
perfect incentives. Firms and households exposed to such a tax would self-select,  taking (only)
those measures that are most effective from society's point of view, irrespective of whether they
could be categorized as technical modifications,  changes in input mix or changes in tLa
consumption basket. Using such a tax, or tradeable pollution permits, the agency charged with
protecting the environment need know nothing but aggregate  marginal costs and benefits of
abatement, since the detailed actions that can be taken to reduce pollution need be known only
by the economy's micro agents 2.
Indeed, had a social planner possessed data on how much pollution each individual caused
through the year, then a year-end tax bill based on related damages would have provided
appropriate incentives to pollution reduction from all kinds of activities. Had emission monitoring
been feasible, the planner would not need to know what options individuals  and firms in different
activities have to reduce emissions, nor how those options compare in terms of costs. In
particular, he would not have needed to design special programs for each sector. Sectors, firms
and individuals would have been affected by his tax scheme simply  in accordance with how much
they polluted, and would each have responded with socially  optimal effort. When continuous
monitoring of individual  emissions is not feasible, however (and it is not yet for motor vehicles),
the planner needs to ask himself which sectors are polluting, what options exist within the sector,
2  general  relut  are well pracanted  in Baumol and Oatea  (1988). Special treatment  of the information economy  of the maket
is found in Weitzman  (1974). Notice that if the planner asesua individual marginal  abatement  cosn with  enora that are not perfstly
correlated  acrou polluters,  be can aasea aggrgate  abatement  coata  with Ica error than he can asim  individual  aatement coat.3
and how he can best stimulate each of them. It is in this context the analysis  of a program to
control  air  pollution  from motor  vehides In  Mexico  City  takes place.
Pollution taxes, rare and still fairly unimportant exceptions in the real world, have been
criticized  on many grounds, and in this article we discuss one of those: For many types of
polluting sources, and automobiles among them, technology does not yet allow continuous
monitoring of individual  emissions. Feasible monitoring - annual testing of individual  rates of
emissions (say, grams per liter or vehicle kilometer) 3 - leaves the environmental agency in a
totally different situation, having to use regulation and incentives in a detailed program aimed at
mimicking  the least cost program that a pollution tax would have induced.
In section 2, we briefly review the theoretical literature on the use of imperfect corrective
taxes, to provide a basis for our analysis.  In section 3, we develop the theoretical background for
cost-effectiveness  analysis  in a very simple, general equilibrium, welfare economic perspective. We
use this framework to show that any program employing inducements to make an activity cleaner
also should contain taxes on the main (polluting) input or output used in the activity, since
containing the level of the activity is justified as long as abatement is costly and some pollution
remains 4. We show that the tax that should accompany  any given level of abatement (say, a three
way catalytic converter) in a cost-effective  program is easily calculated; it does not depend on the
demand elasticity for the polluting good and it does not depend on knowledge about the benefits
of emission  reductions.
Lastly, in section 4, we apply the analysis  to a detailed program of measures to contain
pollution in Mexico City, and show how inclusion  of a gasoline tax in the tool-kit would reduce
the costs of attaining the targeted emission reductions. The savings provided by the proposed tax
are conservatively  assessed, since we have not assumec any premium for transfer of revenue to
3Apart fiom providing  a poor proxy for acul  i-une enmision  rate (see, among othco, lawson at al. 1990), the method does not
combine data on cmision rates  with data on vehicle  udlizAtion  (it could). Ihus, uilizaon  is not discouraged,  unles aba_teme
expenditure raise  the relevant marginal  cost, and, even then, the method  does not discourage  use optimally  and cheaply,  as
complementary  ibnammen could.
4 We  uW  the term  pollung  acdWty  about a consmption  or production activity  aociated  with emsions.  Taxe on goods or
inputs used in the acthiity  or outputs from  the activity  can reduce  emisions thougb reduced activity leveh. Alo,  they can mae  tho
activity  cleaner, per unit, if there is subsiutability and one can tax  a paticularly  poeudng bpat or pollang good.4
the public  sector (a premium  would  be appropriate  in a context  where revenue  generation  has
social  costs),  nor any  value to reducing  other effects  of gasoline  use that are not charged  for, such
as accidents,  congestion  and road damage.
a  Theoretical  Background
Optimal  taxation  theory has mainly  been concerned  with the minimization  of the
distortonary  costs  of revenue-raising  taxes  (See,  for instance,  Mirrlees,  1976).  The broader
normative  public  finance  literature  has also taken on the task of providing  the case  for an
authoritative  government  and intervention  through  public  expenditures,  taxation  and regulation,
where  the two main classes  of objectives  are market  failure  and concerns  about income
distribution  (Atkinson  and Stiglitz,  1980,  and Starrett, 1988,  both provide  broad coverage).  The
result of greatest  relevance  for this study  was  provided  by Pigou (1920),  whose  recommendation
that pollution  problems  could  best be taken care of by taxes  gave  rise to the term Pigowvian
taxes'.
On Pigouvian  (or corrective)  taxes,  theory prescribes  that individuals  should  be
confronted  with  the full marginal  social  costs  of their activities.  Moreover,  theory states  that if
they did,  and if the definition  of social  costs included  such  effects  as the problems  caused  by
pollution, then pollution  control  would  be efficient,  in the sense that there would  be no net
benefits  to society  either to further (or different)  prevention  of pollution  or to more pollution.
Sandmo,  1975,  combines  two  motives  for taxation,  when he analyzes  how  a revenue-
motivated  optimal  tax structure  would  be modified  when a negative  external  effect,  like pollution,
is associated  with one of the commodities.  He shows  that traditional,  distortion-minimizing
revenue  formulas  will  prevail,  but that a Pigouvian  element  will  be contained  in the formula  for
the for the polluting  good. As a special  case,  if the revenue  requirement  is sufficiently  low,
taxation  of the polluting  good may  be sufficient,  so that revenues  can be raised without  causing
distortions.
5  The  position that authoritative interventio, fr  intuce  dtug  Piguvian tutio,  is necess  fr  efficiency  when them are
exernl  eff,  was latr challenged  by Coae  (1960). Coase  gued that voluntary  negoations btween tho e causig  nd hios
afied  by an exernal efcot could provide  for efficieccy.  Later liteatu  has emphasized  that negotion.  may be cosly and
inefficient,  as may an intervening  buaucrt  (See Fannell,  1987, for a simple  exposition nd discussion).5
Other theoretical contributions concerned with Pigouvian, or corrective taxes, have
generally abstracted from the need to generate revenues through distortionary taxes. This could
be interpreted as effectively assuming  that it is not costly  to fund the public sector, or simply  that
the two topics can be analyzed separately'. Many have been concerned with the distortionary
effects of Pigouvian taxes, however, i; analyzing  such taxes when they are not ideal from the
perspective of correcting for external effects.
The most nctable among these are Sandmo, 1976,  Balcer, 1980, and Wijkander, 1985,
all asking whether taxes and subsidies  levied on complements and substitutes can be helpful when
taxation of the polluting good is either not feasible or not perfect, in terms of emission
generation. They find that such supportive instruments can be helpful when, respectively: i) the
polluting good is used both in a polluting and in a non-polluting activity; ii) some users of the
polluting good cause more harm per unit consumed than others, and; iii) taxing the polluting good
directly is not feasible. These results can all be read as special explorations of a point made by
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986); that market equilibria in economies with market failures are not
constrained Pareto optimal, and that a demand system, with all its own- and cross price elasticities,
can provide opporatnities to seek Pareto improvements.
In this essay, we examine a situation where resources can be spent on making the
consumption of a good less polluting 1. The availability  of options in pollution abatement implies
that taxation of the polluting good would not provide ideal incentives, since it would encourage
only the subset of abatement options that reduce the use of the polluting good. Indeed, mandated
abatement, rather than demand management, has been at the heart of pollution control programs
worldwide. We make the simple point that an efficient program exploits opportunities to reduce
activity  levels in polluting activities as v%il  as opportunities to make each activity cleaner. If
emission monitoring were feasible, optimal exploitation of both avenues would have been
implemented by one single instrument: an emission  tax.
Sandmo, 1975,  could  be read as  providing  s  sppoat for such a spaaion, although  the polution control agency  would  need
to cooidinate  with th  revenue  geneatig  agency.
7 We shall  use the term polluing rather  tan  the  more geneal (but chumsier)  exsrnaUuycausLng.  Our model is  equally  valid
for  a problem with positive  eernal  effet.6
In the theoretical  literature,  the distinction  between  optimal  scale  of polluting
activities  and optimal  abatement  has been treated only  tangentially:  The point has been made that
pollution  taxes  are superior  to abatement  subsidies  since  the latter may  lead to "too  much"  of the
polluting  activity  (See, for instance,  Baumol  and  taes,  1988)'.  In our model,  we apply  two
instruments,  an abatement  requirement  and a tzx on a variable  input (the one most strongly
associated  with pollution  generation)  in the polluting  activity.  We show  that, unless  the polluting
good is taxed,  the polluting  activity  is "too  large",  even when  polluters  pay for abatemene.
The use of more than one instrument  to deal with only  one negative  external  effect is
commanded  by a monitoring  problem.  When monitoring  of individual  contributions  to pollution  is
costly,  one will  want to use indirect  instruments  to affect  the different  choices  that can affect
pollution  (See Eskeland  and Jimenez,  1992).
There are many  weaknesses  of a program  of mandated  abatement  requirements,  as
compared  to one implemented  by a true pollution  tax. Ihe improvement  proposed  here, through
the taxation  of a major input or output in the polluting  activity,  merely  removes  one of these
weaknesses  - that abatement  requirements  do not effectively  discourage  demand  for polluting
goods. Our gasoline  tax proposal  is an indirect  instrument  which  reveals  privately  held
information  about which  trips can be sacrificed  at a low  social  cost,  and encourages  firms  and
individuals  to sacrifice  those'".  As an example  of weaknesses  that remain (as compared  to a
program  induced  by a true pollution  tax) in the proposed  air pollution  control  program,  we have
preserved  the assumption  that the agency  has all the knowledge  that exists  about the stats  of
vehicles  and the efficiency  of various  abatement  options.  Consequently,  the proposed  program  is
poorer than a theoretically  conceivable  program  - in which  the pollution  tax would  have revealed
8While  subsidizing  abatement would  give  too high activity  leves in polluig  activi,  making  pollutes pay for  baemoet does
not imply optimal discouragement;  makig polluters  pay fior  damages  wouMd.  Te  pol  pays principle, as advooted  by OBCD,
regrefilly, usally  applies to payment for abatement,  but not for daumge.  (see OBCD 1975,  and Opwchoor  and Vor, 1989).
9 Some insight  into the role tht  can be played by chaqges  in the level of activity  in poutg  otAor  is provided by lorgeaon  and
Wicoxen (1990)  nd HaziLl  and Kopp (1990).  They explore changes  in  ectoral  activity  lvels ue  ae  ult of abatean  coda, bowever,
rather tha  as a rult  of polution taxes,  input  txc  or output taxes.
0 Ws use the sacwtjce  of uips figutively  for options that reduce  pollution  through  reduced demad  for the pollding good.
An importat  category  of such  options are more efficint  ca;  the  ocial cos  will often condst of itmsch  as hiOr  capital  cos
(for inosane through  acceleated replacement) or loss in terms  of  m  other quit  diensios  (size power).7
and exploited  all relevant  privately  held information".  How much  poorer the program  is depends
on how important  these remaining  information  gaps are, assuming  that the agency  exploits
rationally  the information  that it holds.
A simple  model  with  demand  manageLmnt  and abatement
Background  for choice  of model  What should  a model  look like,  to facilitate  the
comparison  of emission  control  options within  a sector,  to the possibility  of shrinking  the overall
level  of activity  in the s- 'tor? The aim  in our analysis  has been to apply  a modelling  framework
which  is simple  enough  to communicate  central  ideas,  but rich enough to compare  the most
relevant  implications  of options  that are so different  that  ey cannot  be anayzed withow  a
modelli'g  framework.  Traditional  pollution  control  programs  have emphasized  the technical
options that can make production  and consumption  activities  less  polluting.  The model  we
propose emphasizes  that manipulation  of demand  for polluting  goods could  represent an
interesting  alternative  or complement  to abatement  (the latter reduce pollution  per unit of
polluting  good consumed).  In the model,  abatement  expenditures  are dealt with  only in a very
superficial  way,  since  we only need to know  the incremental  costs  per unit of emission  reductions
provided.
We thus need a model  which  not only allows  for behavioral  responses  to policies  that
can influence  demand,  but which  also  provides  a measure  of the social  costs  of such demand
manipulation.  The models  proposed  in the welfare  economic  literature are tailored  for those
purposes,  and, ideally,  one would  want to apply  a model  with many  consumers  or groups  of
consumers.  This would  allow  for analysis  of the distribution  of costs  and benefits  across  economic
agents,  apart from efficiency  aspects.
Our focus is on efficiency  implications,  using  a model  with a representative  consumer.
Such a framework  has two principal  shortcomings.  First, it cannot  be helpful  in analyzing  the
effects  on income  distribution.  This abstraction  can be justified  only by assuming  that the effects
11  In revealing  and exploiting  which  trips can be sacrificed  at the lowet  ocil  code, the gaoline tax is  uperior  to the prest
regulation tht  each car is banned  fom driving  a specific  weekday.  Ihe higher  social cos  of uving  trips though the rogulton  is
pty  reflected  by the fact that howseholds  buy driWhgpecnnk,  implicidy,  by regiseing  additional vehicles.8
of the air pollution  contrcl strategy  on income  distribution  is not of major interest,  for instance
because  the planner has available  other instruments  that can cheaply  transfer  income  between
groups" 2. Second, in practice, consumers differ along other dimensions, for irstance by owning
unevenly  polluting  vehicles.  Our model  can best be interpreted as one in which  a representative
consumer  owns  a composite  of the vehicle  fleet in Mexico  City" 3.
We shall  employ  a model  with separability  along  two  lines in the direct utility  function,
as do Batcer  and Wijkander,  and a representative  consumer  model,  as do Sandmo  and Wijkander.
Finally,  we assume  that public  revende  generation  is not in itself  costly.  This assumption  is
reasonable  only if the public  sector revenue requirement  does not exhaust  the potential  of
instruments  available  for costless  revenue  generation  and transfers  to the public  sector.
The consumer's  maximization  Droblem:  Let individual  j's emissions  e! of pollutants
depend  on her consumption of the polluting  good, xJ,  and the abatement  she applies,  a!.  Let her
utility  ui depend on quantities  consumed,  y', xJ,  of non-polluting  goods  and polluting  goods,
respectively,  as well  as the total amount  of emissions  from all n individuals 1 4:
(1)
u-WuI(JOE,  e (x 'a^)
I.1
12 We shl  here ue  the concepts welfare  coAt  and socia coa to dewcribe  net coas, btolled over indiduals,  firma and the
public sctor,  thbu  valuig  coas equally acroa  agent.  We defin  the concept of cots  ahaply in the wecon cost  efccwne  .
13  An emiasion coefficiont,  represeig  gSams of we4ihted emissions  per liter of gasoline  conuimed, is centmal  in our anlysi  of a
gaoline  tax Tus,  the emsion  coefficient wed in this anysi  shall be intfereted  as the marginl  emission  coeffcient for a fleet of
herenouw  vehicles,  when the golim  price is adjustd  ik,  tly.
14  We shal  assume that the utility fwion  aisie the taditonal  regrty  asuwtions:  it is quasiconave, contnuou  aund  twice
diflhnniable.  Further, we ame  that x, y and a ae  constained to noa-neative  values.  We shal assume that the individually  optimal
solion  doe  not involve ither of the come  y - 0  or x  0. We sha  Auther,  in this analyal  section, assme  tht  itl
expenditur  on ab_tment  ae  very productive (abatemnt  is produced at consant  retun  to  cAie,  but its effect on emisions  is
declnn),  so tha the corner a  0 does not occur in the planrs  optimm  unles in combination  with t=  0. Ihe later  asUndon
is tlaxed  i  the applied section,  where discrto  maures  are invecpted  in the surroundings  of the alytically  dermined  optimum.9
Individual  j takes consumer prices as given and maximizes  u' subject to an individual
budget constraint which we shall assume is binding, and a constraint for abatement. The individual
budget constraint is:
(2)
9  +  (P.  + t)x  +pEa  F 1i  +htSE'.
where the price of the non-polluting good is normalized to one, p's with subscripts are producer
prices, and a tax, t., is levied on the poUuting good. P is j's lump sum income, and the last term on
the right hand side is j's share of the tax revenues, all of which are returned to consumers as
transfers. Also, a constraint defines a minimum  of abatement, 'a bar", which would be zero in the
absence of regulation:
(3)
a,  2 
Maximization of  (1) subject to (2) and (3) results in the following  first order conditions for
individual  optimum:
(4)
u'<D  _ P'  . 0,10
(5)
<,  + ,e-  PkP  + t  - -)  = 0,
(6)
u!Oe - pip*  - A}  = 0,
where 0  is the shadow price of j's budget constraint, ?V  is the shadow price of j's abatement
requirement, and subscripts to the function symbols  denote partial derivatives.
Now, let us make the assumption that the individual  does not take into account the
effect of her pollution on herself, and also that she does not take into account the share of her
own tax payments that will  be returned to her; both are either theoretically correct descriptions or
minor approximations if n, the number of individuals  which pollute each other and share public
revenues (here assumed to be the same), is large' 5. Then, from the perspective of individual
optimization, the second and the last left hand terms in equation (5) are zero, and the same holds
for the first term in equation (6).  Further, from (6), we can see that the consumer will adjust
abatement to the lowest possible level, so that (6) can be reduced to:
(7)
a}  = a
Since there are superscripts for only one individual  in the first order conditions,
superscripts can be eliminated. Further, since the utility function is determined only to a
is  Smndnmo,  1975: 'When maximizing  utility...-theindividual consumer, being very mall  compared to the market, will  ie  the
cfrect of a rmcll chn  in his own consumption on the total quantity  of good m consumed (good m is the polluting good in Sandmo's
model, Eakelund's  remmk).11
monotone  transformation,  we can eliminate  the shadow  price of j's budget  constraint  from (5) and
(4) without  losing  information,  to characterize  individual  optimization  by (7) and:
(8)
_  = pX  +  tz
We shall  let the functions  x(a,t) and y(a,t.)  represent  the (Marshallian)  demand
functions  consistent  with the first order conditions  (7) and (8). Further,  since  producer  prices are
fixed,  equilibrium  quantity  changes  will  equal the partial derivatives  of Marshallian  demand
functions.
The Planner's  Maximization  Problem  Now,  let us turn to the planner's  problem.  Let us
assume  there are constant  returns tG  scale so that producer  prices  are given,  and that the
planner's  objective  is to maximize  the sum of utility  levels  for
the n consumers:
(9)
w '=AE  e
Working  with  a representative  consumer  in the following,  we shall  suppress  individual
superscripts,  and describe  the planner as maximizing  the following  welfare  function,  using
mandated  abatement,  a, and a tax on the polluting  good, t., as instruments:' 6
16  Wi,th  harllian  demand  fuCtion  mabutibted  into the utilit  unction,  t  objective  finction in an indire  utility nction.12
(10)
Max  = u(y(a,t),x(a,)Q,nv(x(a,t),a))
subject  to a resource constraint  which  is the sum  of the individuals'  budget  constraints:
(11)
y(at)  + p,X(a,)  + p,a  = I.
We can see that the difference  between the individual's  objective  function,  (1), and
the planner's (10) is that the individual  does not take into account  her effect  on emissions,  since
only  a negligible  amount affects  herself,  while  the planner  takes into account  the effect  of
emissions  on all individuals.  A similar  difference  is present in their respective  resource constraints
(2) and (11); while  the individual  looks  at tax payments  as costs,  the planner takes into account
that they are all redistributed.  Thus to the planner,  taxes  paid are not lost, and bear costs  only  to
the extent  that they  distort resource  use. Since  we assume  transfers  are made without  costs,  only
the former  of these differences  in the two optimization  problems  represent a challenge  to policy
in our model.
Maximizing  (10)  subject  to (1  1). we have the following  first  order conditions  for the
socially  optimal  allocation:
(12)
ya(uy  y)  +  x,(u.X  nuex - yp)  + nue.  - yp,  = 0
(13)
ytX(v  ~-  y)  + x,(u,  + ra.e  - yp)  =  013
We can differentiate society's resource constraint (11) with respect to a and t. to
obtain expressions for the equilibrium changes in demand:
(14)
ya  5  =  Pa  - Pa,
(15)
Yt,  PAt,.
Substituting (14) and (15) into (12) and (13), the first order conditions for social optimum are:
(16)
x,ux  + nu,e,  - ptu)  +  nu,e,  - p,u y =  0,
(17)
xtue  + nuec  - pA,)  = 0.
Assuming  that x. and x, are not zero' 7, we can solve for the marginal rates of
substitution, to find that the optimal allocation is characterized by:
17If consumption  of polluting  goods  is completely  inendtive  to the intumes  t  and  a (meaning  that the consum  absorbs  all
codJ of the tax and the atement  requ_  tem  via  adjudmna  in consuztion of non-pollutig  goods  only),  then c/es - nu,
characteize the optimal  prmgram,  wheme t, is not upecified,  shm it has no allocatviw  effect.14
(18)
I'  +  _Ve  - Pa
(19)
U  es
As (18) and (19) shows, the sum across individuals  of the marginal rates of substitution
be equal to the marginal rates of transformation, consistent with Samuelson's (1954) result.
Samuelson's definition of a public good, that it be non-exclusive in consumption, suits well for the
quality of ambient air.
Rearranging, and using that marginal rates of substitution in consumption will equal
consumer prices (8), we can get some additional intuition about the optimal abatement and tax
rate:
(20)
Rid  e  t  n  t,  *  = - -=  - ' X
MY  ps  ux  +nuoe
(20) states that the tax levied on the polluting good should drive a wedge between the
marginal rates of substitution equal to the part of the associated impact on welfare that the
consumer does not take into account herself.
Eliminating nu., we can see that optimality reqdires:IS
(21)
t,,  P. _  ._ _  _.
(21) states  that the optimal  tax rate on the polluting  good, per unit of emissions  from
the polluting  good,  is equal to the direct marginal  cost of abatement  per unit of achieved  emission
reductions.  (21) will  prove a useful  comparison  when  we, in the following,  characterize  a cost
effective  program.
Before proceeding,  let us notice that the optimal  program,  as characterized  by (18)
and (19), could  be implemented  by one instrument,  an emission  tax, if it were available.  This is
easily  checked  by replacing  the instruments  in (10) with  a tax levied  on emissions,  and modifying
the individual  budget  constraint,  (2), accordingly.
Cost effective  pollution  control  The  optima progran,  above,  is characterized  by
abatement  and demand  management  being pursued  to the point where  marginal  benefits equal
marginal  costs.  If benefit estimates  are unavailable,  or in dispute,  helpfil results  can be provided
by asking  how  a given,  targeted emission  reduction  can be achieved  at lowest  possible  costs'.
Such analysis  is called  cost effectiveness  analysis.  In the following,  we will  show  how the concept
of cost effectiveness  fits into traditional  framework  of welfare  economic  analysis.
As we saw  in the preceding,  when producer  prices are fixed,  supply  is infinitely  elastic,
and equilibrium  marginal  changes  in quantities  will  equal  the partial derivatives  of the Marshallian
demand  functions.  Starting  from an arbitrary  point a, t1, with feasible  quantities  y, x and a, welfare
is at the outset the following:
is  Enidmas wil often be foumn  unavailble or of lmited applcabilit fot quazi"icain  of physical  awto  nch  u the e  offct
on ambieat ur quality  of eion  reductions,  and  the efiects on heat  of improved  ambicat  r,  s"  wll  as for valuation  of  nch
outcome. For a rcn,  bricf,  gnal  dscuion,  aem  Crpper and Oates, 1992. Briefly  on what is applicable for Mexico:  Mruls,
1991.16
022)
w  - HaA~)A
where we have let unhat', an uncertain  estimate  of how many  individuals  are affected  by an
individual's  emissions,  represent the uncertnty  in the estimate  of the benefits of emission
control.
Rather than maximzing  (22) subject  to a constraint  on emissions  (which,  in the end,
we will  do), let us ask the following  question:  Starting  from an arbitrary  point, t0 ,a, what is the
rate at which  welfare  changes  if we change  the tax rate slighty? Differentiating  (22) with  respect
to t,, we have:
(23)
A  =  yj,  +  (us  + R,c),
&x
Using  the partial derivative  of the resource constraint,  (15),  and the first order condition  for
individual  optimum,  (8), we have:
(24)
W  (tF,  4+ xue)xu
Emissions  will  also change  when we change  the tax rate; from (1), we have:17
(25)
ac
Dividing (24) by (25), the margLJd wefare tmpact  of changing the tax rate, per unit
of associated emission reductions is:
(26)
&x  s  e*+Ru
While this is a (net) marginal cost expression, we can notice that if we were allowed to
adjust only this instrument for the purpose of emission control, then setting (26) equal to zero
would be optimal (consistent with (20)).
Following the same procedure as for the tax rate, we have the marginal impact on
welfare when the abatement requirement is changed slightly  from an arbitrary level, per unit of
associated emission reductions:
(27)
w,a.  - _______
aa aa  e.  x,  + e,
Composing a cost effective program requires the comparison of marginal costs of
emission reductions across instruments. However, in comparing the cost expressions for the two
instruments (26) and (27), no information would be lost if we were to use a cost measure which
19We.  wii  wave the tanm  m  ind  wfwc  comu  o  a mesm  that docc not include  the expected banfimt,  *n  hat u0 , to
conibfm  with  covenion  that mamin  codt  equal  maegini benefits  in optimm  (me below).18
does not include an assumed effect of emissions on welfare. Starting from an arbitrary point,
eliminating "n hat u." would simply  subtract the same amount from the cost expression for each
instrument.
We can therefore define a measure of marginal welfare cost which only includes the
sacrificed consumption of market goods. Subtracting "n hat u," from (26), the marginal cost at




Similarly,the marginal cost at which abatement requirements provide emission
reductions, in terms of sacrificed  consumption of market goods, is:
(29)
~ ae (tx  - ). -I-  =  _t__-  p_lu_
aa  aa  cx  c
Using the measure "dwhat" for marginal costs, we can notice that optimal policies are
characterized by marginal costs equal to  "n hat u.". This cost concept thus has the advantage of
conforming to the convention that optimality be characterized by marginal costs being equal to
marginal benefit. The main advantage of using this cost concepts however, is that the analysis  of
alternative emission reduction strategies can be isolated from the analysis  of the benefits of
emission reductions.19
What, then, can we learn from these expressions? First, notice the simplicity  of (28):
marginal costs depend only on the tax rate on the polluting good (remember that we assume that
other goods are priced at marginal costs) and on the marginal impact on emissions of consuming
the polluting good (say, grams of pollutants emitted per liter of gasoline conisumed)'. Second, let
us notice what is not in (28): the marginal cost of using tax rate changes to reduce emissions does
not depend on the elasticity of demand for polluting goods. The reason is, as we have seen, that
the demand responsiveness,  x,, affects welfare through product markets multiplicatively,  in the
same way as it affects emissions. Consequently, it does not affect the ratio between the two. This
result does not say that the amount of emission  benefits offered by a given tax change is
independent of the demand elasticity. What it says is that the marginal welfare costs, per unit of
obtained emission reductions, is independent of the demand elasticity. As an example, if the
elasticity were small, then the emission reductions would be small, but so would be the costs from
sacrificed consumption, since changes in consumption would be small 21.
This result is illustrated in Figure 1, which is drawn for a given level of abatement,
and, consequently, a given e,. The welfare cost of a tax change "dt" is the trapezoid abcd,
approximated by the rectangle t-dx. Emission benefits, "de",will equal exdx,  and "dx"cancels out
in the ratio between the two, which is the expression for marginal costs.
20  For pactical purpos,  the asmmption that the  esponiveness of omssio  to a gaoline  price chang  will be propostional to
the resonsivene  of gasoline consumption (i.e. C = e/x) is a  ir, thougb prbably  conservativ ausumption  (Knpnick, IM,  provides
some analysis).  Witb the caveat that the consumption  pattern does not  hange (average  trip length should stay condant, for iance,
since cold-stat  are very polluting),  proportionality  between fuel consWuption  and emisdons is asumed  in the main emisson
projctdon models,  such as EPA's 'Mobile 4  and  AP-42.
21  The rul  should be of no supdrise.  Tbe frst baid  theorem of welfar economics says  that efficiency  is ensued when  agents
faee the muginal socil cos  and benfits  of their actions, iespective  of elasticities.20
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From this, it is clear that the part of the gasoline demand curve which lies above the
marginal cost of supply for gasoline is a supply curve for emission reductions, reading from right
to left (we have used emissions per liter of gasoline, e1, to produce an alternative unit of
measurement along the x-axis).
The expression for marginal welfare costs of abatement requirements, (29), is
considerably more complicated. In particular, the responsiveness  of demand to stricter abatement
requirements, x,, remain a determinant both of the welfare costs (in the numerator) and of the
emission reductions (in the denominator). Somewhat  paradoxically,  the cost effectiveness of
technical abatement (changing emission coefficients) depends on the demand responsiveness,
whereas the cost effectiveness  of changes in the tax rate, the demand management instrument,
does notl'  Also, we can notice that marginal welfare costs of additional abatement are equal to
marginal benefits if policies are optimal. Too see this, use (20) and (21) to substitute for t  and p.
in (29).
A cost effective program requires the two instruments to be utilized so that their
marginal costs are equalized. Setting (28) and (29) equal to each other, we find that cost effective
programs are characterized by:
(30)
tx  =  Pa
ex  _a
(30) is also the solution to the maximization  of welfare (22) subject to an emission
constraint, and each of the expressions in (30) would equal the shadow price of the constraint (by
22  Seveml  authors  have  addressed the issue that abatement requirements affect emisions through demand responsiveness,  most
notably that the higher costs of new cars decelerate replacement  of older, dirtier cas (Crandall et al., 1986,  Berkovec,  1985). Equation
(18) does not comprise  such effects on  fleet  demographics (which will,  to some extent,  wash  out in the long run), but emphsizes that
demand responsivenes will influence  costs, via utility lost due to sacrificed  consumption,  and emisdons, via the same adjustmnts in
consumption.22
going this indirect way, we have also derived the marginal cost for each instrument when they are
not exploited cost-effectively).
Thus, the set of cost effective programs can be characterized without estimates of
demand responsiveness.  Further, notice that tWle  attractiveness of a tax on the polluting good does
not depend on the availability  of benefit estimates; the mere application of mandated abatement
reveals that welfare costs can be saved, keeping emissions constant, if taxation of polluting goods
is not applied accordingly'. Notice that the left hand side expression is the marginal cost
measure for the tax on polluting goods, while the right hand expression is the simple, or direct
marginal cost for abatement expenditures. Thus, we have shown that this simplistic  measure of
cost effectiveness,  often applied in practical studies, is valid, but only if the polluting good is taxed
accordinglyl  Notice also that (30), which is a complete characterization of the continuu-m  of cost
effective programs, is equal to (21), which, together with (19), characterize the optimal program.
Thus, obvious to some, the optimal program is a special case amongst cost effective programs.
In figure 2, we have illustrated how one can think about a cost effective program. The
horizontal axis is the amount of emission reductions targeted. From left to right, we have drawn a
marginal cost curve for emission reductions via abatement expenditures (which we now know
should include demand responsiveness,  although in a cost effective program, as a special case,
demand responsiveness cancels out). From right to left, we have drawn the part of the gasoline
demand curve which lies above the marginal cost of supply, where the scale must be such that
liters match tons emitted on the scale from right to left. A cost effective program is found where
the two curves intersect. For any other combination of abatement and tax rate which satisfies the
target, the difference between the two marginal cost curves can be saved by substituting, at the
margin, the cheaper for the less expensive instrument.
2  Direct emission tas  (or tradeable emission  permits)  op,tinmaly  combine discouragement  of the poliutiug  activity  and incentives
to making  it cleanr. Mandated abatement, on the other hand, needs to be accompanied  by inatments  discouaging activity  levels  to
minimize  welfar  costs of emiuion reductions.Figure  2
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There is another way of exploiting  the results of this section, however. (30) states that
if you know the marginal costs per unit of emissions reduced via technical controls, then you also
know the gasoline tax rate with which it should be combined, for the program to be cost effective.
We shall apply this perspective in the following  application of our results to data on pollution
control options in Mexico City.
4  AjApplication  to an air pollution control program
In an analysis  of emission control options for motor vehicles in Mexico City, technical
control options were ranked according to incremental costs per unit of weighted emission
reductions provided (Table 1)2. The list is thus sorted in the sequence it would be implemented
if willingness  to pay were gradually increased. However, demand reb,ponsiveness  is not
incorporated in the figures; they simply  show the direct incremental costs of abatement divided by
the increment in emission reductions, c./e., and consequently do not provide the information we
would want for marginal costs of abatement, as shown by formula (29). As (30) shows, however,
demand responsiveness cancels out in the expression for marginal costs of abatement if a program
is cost-effective. Thus, the figures are valid estimates of marginal costs if the abatement initiatives
are accompanied by a gasoline tax that is optimal, conditional on the extent of abatement.
Sec World  Bank, 1992:  Trnport  Air Quality Mamgemsnt for Mexico City Metrpolita  AM: Sector  Study. Weighted  gram
(or tons) of emissons refer to the foUowing:  Air pollution control program will  generally (and should)  addres seveal species  of
emitted pollutu  simultaneously,  and a prioritization  is necesuy.  In the World  Dank  analys  of the Mexico  City protgrm,  the
following  weights  werm  applied,  attempting  to reflect  the desirbility to achieve ambice standards  as well U  the contnibution  by each
cmitted gram  to ambient concentrations:  Lad: 8S/g,Nox: 4.71g,PMIO:  2.3tg,Duft: O.91g,Sox:  1.41g,CO:  0.04/g(Sec Weaver, 1991).25
Table 1: Mexico City: Abatement  measues  and matching gasoline tax rates
Coat: Thousand  Cumulative  Cumulative  Matching
Dollars per  Em jaion  Costa Abatement  Gasoline
weighted  ton  Reduction  Only (Mn USD)  Tax
Mn wid ton  Cents/liter
Gas Truck LPG Retrofit  -379  90  0  -4.4
Minibus CNG Retrofit  -248  148  0  -2.8
Gas Truck CNG Retrofit  -225  231  0  -2.4
Gasoline Vapor Recovery  -80  275  0  -0.8
Re-engine Buses  140  299  3  1.4
inmibus  1992  Standards  181  391  20  1.7
I&M High-Use Vehicles  209  545  52  1.8
Gasoline Truck 1993 Standards  264  632  75  2.1
Taxis Tier I Standards  322  641  78  2.5
Re-engine R-100 Buses  482  651  83  3.7
Taxi Replacement, 1993 standards  510  714  115  3.7
Centr. Enp. & Maintenance,  passenger cars  651  771  152  4.4
Passenger cars to 1993 standards.  669  883  227  4.0
Diesel Especial  699  893  234  4.2
Lower  Regular  R.  Vapor  Pressure  to 7.5  836  904  243  4.9
Provide Regular Unleaded  923  954  289  5.1
Decentralized Inp.  & Maint., Passenger cars  1034  1018  356  5.3
Replace Gasoline Trucks  1114  1096  442  5.0
5% MTBE in Regular Unleaded Gas  *ine  1201  1116  467  5.3
Lower RVP in Premium Unleaded. to 7.5  1313  1128  482  5.6
Road Paving  (1000 kn)  1335  1136  498  5.7
Passenger Car 1991 standards  1367  1180  508  5.4
Reduce Sulphur to .1% in Diesel  1371  1187  569  5.3
Passenger cars rier  1 standards  1629  1201  578  6.2
US specifications  for Diesel  2097  1207  601  7.9
11 % MTBE in Regular Unleaded Gasoline  2447  1219  613  9.0
5% MTBE in Premium  Unleaded  Gasoline  13487  1222  643  49.0
11% MTBE in Premium Unleaded Gasoline  14728  1226  686  53.226
Such a matching gasoline tax is shown in column 4 in Table 1. As an example, if the
measure called "1993  standards for Passenger cars" were the costliest applied in a program, we
would know that 669 dollars per weighted ton of emissions was the cost of abatement to be
matched by the gasoline tax. Using the fact that with that and all the cheaper measures in effect,
emissions per liter for the fleet as a whole would average 60 weighted grams, we can calculate
that the gasoline tax should be 4 cents per liter, using (30YS.  These tax rates represent optimal
discouragement of gasoline use, given the burden placed on gasoline users to make their use
cleaner. Any combination of technical controls with a lower gasoline tax than suggested implies
that consumers could be made better off, keeping total emissions  unchanged, by spending less on
abatement, in return for lower gasoline consumption.
The observant reader will notice that the tax rate per liter of gasoline in Table 1
increases less than proportionally with the costs of applied technical measures. The explanation
for this is that the technical measures reduce emissions  per liter, so emissions per liter, e,:  (the
base for a presumptive Pigouvian gasoline tax), are declining as we climb the control cost curves.
Therefore, the gasoline tax also becomes an increasingly  expensive instrument in pollution
control; each liter carries less emissions as successive  control measures are undertaken, so the
sacrifice  of a liter in consumption offers less in terms of emission reductions the cleaner is the
average vehicle.
To provide an estimate of the additional emission reductions resulting from the
gasoline tax, however, we need to apply an estimate of the elasticity of gasoline demand.  Berndt
and Botero (1985) estimated demand equations based on pooled regional (1973-78) as well as
national times series data (1968-79) for gasoline sales in Mexico. Concluding, based on a number
of models, they advise an "average"  short run price elasticity of -.2, and a long run elasticity of -.7.
25  669 dolur per ton-(  t. do1Iar  por litr/6O  gmm  pr  liter ) * 10  - > t.-S  0.04.
20 Seveira  approdmdonrA  a  employed  in  d  i  calculation:  Pat,  techl  mmr  an  al aaumed  to reduce  the averag
emiiuon  coefficiean by the mout they reduce  oveal  emissons. Seody,  tho  demnd changes  induced by the gsolin  tax  ar
aumed not to affiet the coda or boefits  of the  echnical  measr.27
In our calculations,  since  we are estimating  the effects  on the 1995  emission  inventory,  we have
employed  a price elasticity  of -.4, assumed  to hold in the medium  termZe.
Using  a demand  elasticity  estimate  of -.4, we can calculate  the additional  emission
reductions  that will  be provided  by the gasoline  tax at every  level  of the technical  control  cost
curve.  Since  the gasoline  tax will  induce  demand  to contract,  more emission  reductions  will  be
provided  at every  cost level,  and the result is a more moderately  sloped  control cost curve.  The
two control  cost curves  are shown  in figure  3, with  the area between  the curves  representing  the
difference  in total costs  between  a strategy  based  solely  on technical  controls  and a strategy
including  demand  management  with  the help of a gasoline  tax.
27 Some other empiical cudie  indicrte  the me  rage. Pindyck,  1979,  uces pooled data  and finda:  For OBCD countnie, the
price elmaticity  exceeds  -.4 when the time for adjuatment in four yea  or  more;  for Brazil and  Mexico,  edimate  are -. 12 for th  short
run  and -.SS for the long nn.  Stenw et al., IM,  report  eastimation  of varioua  models  for 21 OECD counties (time  ser, and
pooled),  with an averrge  of -.25 for short  run  elaticitiec and -.8 for long rn  eiaticties.Figure  3
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Under these assumptions,  a gasoline  tax of 6.2 cents  per liter (26%,  ad valorem)
reduces  demand  by about 10 percent for a program  targeted to reduce weighted  emissions  by 1.2
million  annual  tons by 1995. Applying  such a tax thus allows  for 10%  additional  emission
reductions  at a willingness  to pay of USD 1629/ton.  We can notice that only a couple among  all
the abatement  measures  offer emission  reductions  of that magnitude. Alternatively,  if settling  for
a target of 1.2  million  tons, one can avoid  employing  measures  escalating  in costs  from USD
1335/ton  upwards  to 1629.  The cost savings  would  be an estimated  64 million  dollars  annually,  or
11 percent of the estimated  total control  costs. An additional  benefit would  be that the gasoline
tax, in Mexico  City  alone,  would  generate an estimated  350  million  dollars  in revenue.
The following  can highlight  the interdependency  between  the two sets of instruments.
When control  costs  reach 1629  dollars  per ton, average  emission  coefficients  have been reduced
by 70 percent, reducing  the base for the presumptive  emission  tax on gasoline  to 30 percent of its
pre-control  level. Thus,  at a willingness  to pay of 1629  dollars  per ton, the optimal  gasoline  tax
rate would  have been 20 cents per liter, rather than 6.1, if it were the only  available  instrument.
At this level,  gasoline  taxes  alone would  have reduced  emissions  by 34 percent,  generating
revenues  of almost  800  million  dollar?.
A higher  gasoline  tax could  be justified  by a number  of alternative  assumptions,  but
not (as shown  in Section  3) by a higher (or lower)  demand  elasticity.  Firstly,  since  the technical
control cost curve  is steep for reductions  exceeding  1.2  million  tons, a further rise in the gasoline
tax is one among  very few  effective  instruments  if further reductions  are needed. Secondly,
attaching  a separate  value  to the transfer  of funds from  the private sector  to the public  sector,
quite rational  for a country  that has suffered  severely  under inadequate  public  finances,  would
justify  a higher tax rate (in the present  analysis,  no value to this transfer  is assumed). Thirdly,
reduction  in usage also  has benefits  in terms  of reduced congestion,  noise and accidents,  neither
of which  are accounted  for in this analysis.
G  iven the assmod  time perpctive  of 2-4 years,  the aumption  that all the tehnical moama  have  reached their fbll  effect b
probably  optimistic,  indicating that the bae  of the preamptive  golim  tax (and conaneqdy  Its  ae),  b conseratively aaaead.30
Concluding .-marks
The task set was to study whether imperfect demand management instruments such as
gasoline taxes can play a role in a cost effective pollution control program. We started by
presenting an analytical  framework which allows the comparison of demand management
instruments with mandated abatement requirements. On theoretical grounds, the framework
provided the following  results: i) adding mandated abatement requirements to a program
consisting  of indirect taxes will improve the program; ii) adding indirect taxes to a program
consisting  of mandated abatement requirements will improve the program; iii) the set of programs
in which abatement and demand management is combined in a cost-effective fashion is
characterized without knowledge of the demand elasticity for gasoline; iv) the cost associated with
not including gasoline taxes in the tool-kit for the control program is, however, larger the higher
the demand elasticity.
To investigate the practical significance  of these findings, the framework was applied
to a recently analyzed program of technical interventions to reduce air pollution from urban
transport in Mexico City. It was found that a tax of 6.2 cents per liter would be suitable for a
program aimed at reducing emissions from the 1995  vehicle fleet by about 70 per cent. Using a
demand elasticity of -.4, the gasoline tax would make the targeted emission reductions attainable
at 11 per cent lower social costs, including the welfare costs of demand manipulation. The low
level of the tax is partly explained by the fact that the technical interventions will  have reduced
average emission coefficients by 60 to 70 per cent, so that marginal emissions  per liter, the base of
a Pigouvian gasoline tax, are also diminished.  The recommended tax would have been higher if: i)
a value were associated with the transfer of funds to the public sector (the tax will collect 350
million dollars in Mexico City alone); ii) higher emission reductions were targeted, and/or; iii)
reduced congestion, accidents and road damage were valued as well.
After recent increases in gasoline prices of 50 per cent, implicit tax rates in Mexico are
higher than those suggested above. The higher tax rate may well be justified by the reasons
mentioned, as well as by the fact that average emission coefficients are still much higher than
those assumed above for 1995.  For a city with a persistent problem of air pollution, it is possible
that the tax decrease over time, if reductions in emissions  coefficients are sufficient to so warrant,
or that it increase over time, if the increase in demand is such that increasingly  expensive
measures must be undertaken.31
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